The 1970 Organized Crime Control Act authorized the president and Congress to appoint a commission to examine gambling in the United States. The commission was charged with conducting a “comprehensive legal and factual study of gambling” in the United States and all its subdivisions and was instructed to “formulate and propose such changes” in policies and practices as it might “deem appropriate”. At its conclusion, the commission included four U.S. senators (Democrats John McClellan of Arkansas and Howard Cannon of Nevada and Republicans Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania and Bob Taft of Ohio) and four members of the House (Democrats James Hanley of New York and Gladys Spellman of Maryland and Republicans Charles Wiggins of California and Sam Steiger of Arizona). Seven “citizen” members included Commission chairman Charles Morin, a Washington, D.C., attorney; state attorney general Robert List of Nevada; Ethel Allen, a city council member in Philadelphia; Philip Cohen, director of the National Legal Data Center; prosecutor James Coleman of Monmouth County, New Jersey; Joseph Gimma, a New York banker; and professor of economics Charles Phillips of Washington and Lee University. Former federal prosecutor James Ritchie served as the executive director of the commission. The commission had a life of almost three years. The first meetings were in January 1974, and its final report was presented on 15 October 1976.
The commission staff of nearly thirty professionals, twenty student assistants, and twenty-six consultants prepared several dozen research studies. Additionally, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan was engaged to conduct the first national survey of gambling behavior ever taken. It also conducted a gaming survey of the Nevada population. The commission also held forty-three days of public hearings in Washington, D.C., as well as in several other cities, including Las Vegas. Testimony was received from 275 law enforcement personnel; persons involved with gambling enterprises, both legal and illegal; and persons representing the general public.
The report presented conclusions suggesting a much more relaxed view of gambling than had been found in earlier federal investigations. Indeed, the commission seemed to be urging the federal government to remove itself from the regulatory process almost entirely. A certain mixed message was given – a recognition that gambling has a downside, but a frustration that legislation seeking to totally outlaw gambling is simply unenforceable. Hence citizens and governments were urged, for the most part, to “roll with the punches”.
The sense of the commission’s feelings is presented in Chairman Morin’s Foreword to the final report: “[We] should carefully reflect on the significance of the fact that a pastime indulged in by two-thirds of the American people, and approved of by perhaps 80 percent of the population, contributes more than any other single enterprise to police corruption…. and to the well-being of the Nation’s criminals…. Most Americans gamble because they like to, and they see nothing wrong with it.” He then highlights a statement from the report: “Contradictory gambling policies and lack of resources combine to make effective gambling law enforcement an impossible task….” He adds, “Not ‘difficult’ – not ‘frustrating’ not even ‘almost impossible’ – but impossible. And why not? How can any law which prohibits what 80 percent of the people approve of be enforced?”(Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling 1976, ix).
The commission made a firm recommendation that gambling policy be a matter that is determined by the states. Indeed, it urged that Congress enact a statute “that would insure the states’ continued power to regulate gambling” (Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling 1976, 5). Moreover, the federal government was asked to take care that its regulations and taxing powers not interfere with states’ rights in this area. The commission urged that player winnings from gambling activities not be subject to federal income taxes and that the federal wagering tax and slot machine tax be removed. State authorities were asked to devote law enforcement energies against persons operating gambling enterprises at a “higher” level and to relax enforcement against “low-level” gambling offenses. Prohibitions against public social gambling should be removed. If a state had a substantial amount of illegal gambling, however, the federal government should be authorized to use electronic surveillance techniques not authorized before, and judges were urged to give longer prison terms and more substantial fines to convicted offenders.
The report suggested that states use considerable caution before they legalized casinos. If they did so, the state regulatory law should provide a series of player protection provisions. Moreover, casinos should be private, not government, enterprises. Casinos should not be built in “urban areas where lower income people reside” (Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling 1976, 3). The commission recommended that racetracks and offtrack betting facilities lower the take-out rate on wagers (the amount the track removes from its betting pool). If the bettors were able to keep more of their wagers at legal betting facilities, they would be less inclined to turn to illegal operators when placing bets. The states should also determine if players were allowed to make wagers on out-of-state races. The commission felt that state lotteries were often unfair to players and that full information about true odds for the games should be presented to the public. Advertisements by the lotteries should also be more honest and accurate. States were discouraged from allowing wagers on single-event sports games, especially on games involving amateur teams. The commission recommended that states not have sports betting without a referendum vote of the citizens.
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